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1 RAPE IN VIRTUAL REALITY 
As virtual reality (VR) technology evolves and becomes increasingly accessible, 
we must address several moral dilemmas. How should we behave and evaluate our actions 
in virtual reality? Do our actions in virtual reality have “real” consequences? What is the 
relationship between our physical and virtual selves? One of the most notable dilemmas 
involves the gamer’s dilemma, as evaluated by Morgan Luck, or the inability to find a clear 
moral distinction between virtual murder and virtual pedophilia. Several attempts have 
been made to find a principled distinction that condones virtual murder but finds virtual 
pedophilia to be morally reprehensible. This philosophical puzzle may seem abstract, but 
the implications of the gamer’s dilemma will create guidelines for how we conduct 
ourselves in a new plane of reality that may very well become a common household 
commodity. 
We could also completely divide virtual reality from physical reality; moral 
characters and evaluations should not transfer between the two – but imagine that your 
friend is a virtual reality enthusiast. One day, they mention that they have raped a character 
in a virtual reality game. This is shocking as they previously condemned rape in the “real,” 
that is, physical world. They believe there is no “real” harm in virtual rape because no 
“real” person affiliated with their victim. Your friend reminds you that our conception of 
rape depends upon the violation of someone’s bodily integrity and autonomy. The 
characters your friend interacts with are sets of pixels and so do not have the ability to have 
bodily integrity or autonomy.  
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However, even without there being a “real” victim, there seems to be something 
wrong with engaging in virtual rape. Is it possible that the wrong of virtual rape does not 
depend upon the consequences and impact on a victim, but rather in the act itself? This 
question calls for a departure from our current conception of rape. It asks us to question 
the relationship that we have created between committing wrongs and perpetuating harm. 
The case of rape in virtual reality highlights the need to reexamine the ways through which 
we find certain actions to be morally reprehensible. 
I am not equating virtual rape to physical rape. In fact, I believe that several facets 
of rape in virtual reality are ambiguous and must be clarified as virtual reality becomes 
increasingly accessible and mainstream. Firstly, when do consider virtual acts to be “real” 
and what exactly happens to the self when one enters virtual reality? Focusing on virtual 
rape, what is happening when your friend rapes a non-playable character in virtual reality? 
How does it differ from physical rape? What is the relationship between harm and 
committing wrongs? Most importantly, what makes virtual rape wrong? 
I plan to focus on the last four questions I have posed. It is my goal to 1) explain 
what occurs when one engages in virtual rape; 2) identify relevant moral differences 
between physical rape and virtual rape; 3) challenge the existing relationship between 
committing harm and wrong in the case of rape; and 4) argue that virtual rape is morally 
reprehensible due to the agent’s intention to utilize a person as a mere tool for pleasure.  
Ultimately, I hope to solve a modified version of the gamer’s dilemma where virtual 
pedophilia is expanded to a more generalized category: virtual rape. By virtual rape, I am 
referring to any actions occurring in VR that would be considered to be rape if they took 
place in PR. Additionally, I believe broadening the scope of virtual pedophilia to virtual 
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rape, or rape in VR, allows us to address immediate concerns such as women who have 
already reported being groped in virtual reality (Belamire).  
To accomplish these goals, I will first define the virtual landscapes and characters 
at play. I will then introduce Morgan Luck’s response to the gamer’s dilemma. Next, I will 
analyze Stephanie Patridge and Christopher Bartel’s responses to the gamer’s dilemma. 
Patridge and Bartel focus on virtual rape and virtual pedophilia in traditional, flat screen 
video games but I believe their arguments are applicable as they provide interesting 
connections between virtual wrongs and real harm. I will then explore how consent 
operates in virtual reality by utilizing rape fantasies and rape pornography as parallel cases. 
I will then argue that an agent’s intentions extend into virtual reality in a way that reveals 
their moral character. Specifically, regarding virtual rape, an agent’s intentions are morally 
wrong.  
1.1 THE GAMER’S DILEMMA AGENTS, CHARACTERS, AND LANDSCAPES 
For this thesis, virtual reality (VR) refers to virtual landscapes that are fully 
immersive and have first-person perspective such as that offered by Oculus Rift, HTC 
Vive, and PlayStation VR. Physical reality (PR) refers to the ordinary world we all live in 
day to day. The parameters of VR as we have defined it mean that there exists only one 
player in VR. This player, the agent, controls their character, or avatar. All other characters 
are sets of pixels integrated into the virtual landscape. The avatar is dependent upon its user 
to have any motivations or actions. In addition to the player’s avatar (player character), 
non-playable characters (NPCs) are automatically generated. They are not controlled by 
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any “real” person in PR but are programmed to perform or behave in certain ways. In our 
case, I will assume that NPCs are neither sentient or prone to developing sentience.  
Our NPCs exist only within the virtual world. As NPCs have no well-being, they 
cannot be harmed or made worse off. They experience no true pain, and there are no lasting 
effects such as flashbacks. I want to argue that thinking of harm in this way, to be made 
worse off, is distracting to the current issue of the wrongs of virtual rape. I will not argue 
that NPCs feel pain or should be treated as human. I agree that NPCs are not harmed when 
they are virtually raped. Instead, I want to discover the relationship between harm and 
engaging in virtual rape. When an agent rapes an NPC, is there someone being harmed and 
if so, who and how? However, firstly, should the wrongs of virtual rape be contingent upon 
harm?  
1.2 THE GAMER’S DILEMMA 
In “The gamer’s dilemma: An analysis of the arguments for the moral distinction 
between virtual murder and virtual paedophilia,” Morgan Luck objects to five possible 
arguments that claim to solve the gamer’s dilemma. As in our case of virtual rape, the 
victim of virtual murder is a computer-controlled adult-NPC and cannot respawn. Luck 
focuses on instances of “clear” pedophilia and murder, or cases where the agent would be 
deemed a pedophiliac or a murderer if they committed their VR actions in PR. 
First, Luck challenges the idea that social norms should dictate whether a virtual 
action is acceptable or unacceptable. Social norms dictate that virtual murder is acceptable. 
However, the stigmatization of pedophilia makes it unacceptable in PR or VR. Luck argues 
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that relying upon social acceptability is an explanation of our intuitions concerning virtual 
reality and not a moral justification for virtual murder.  
The second argument, “Significant likelihoods,” is consequentialist in nature. It 
presumes that instances of virtual murder do not result in an increased probability of PR 
murders, but the opposite is true for acts of virtual pedophilia. In other words, individuals 
who commit acts of pedophilia in VR are more likely to commit acts of pedophilia in PR. 
“Significant likelihoods” argues that any act which is likely to result in harm is immoral, 
but there is little to no empirical evidence supporting the premises of this argument. Some 
arguments claim that condoning virtual pedophilia may lead pedophilias to satisfy their 
desires in VR as opposed to PR. This argument would create a moral obligation for 
individuals to engage in virtual pedophilia.  
His third argument challenges Aristotelian arguments that are concerned with 
potential injuries to the agent’s character. To enjoy virtual pedophilia indicates that one 
may enjoy physical pedophilia. Thus, you would be harming yourself as this is a pleasure 
that damages one’s moral character. It is important to note that virtue-based arguments do 
not identify an inherent wrong with the action of virtual pedophilia. Furthermore, this 
argument claims that individuals partake in virtual murder not because they find virtual 
murder pleasurable but to satisfy their competitive nature. Luck finds this argument 
improbable as it is very likely that certain individuals who engage in virtual pedophilia are 
not satisfied by virtual pedophilia itself. For example, a game where one must steal Crown 
Jewels from the Tower of London may necessitate the seduction of a Beefeater’s fifteen-
year-old daughter (Luck 34). Completing this action does not indicate that one finds virtual 
pedophilia enjoyable but rather wishes to win the game. This argument fails as it neither 
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proves that agents do not enjoy virtual murder for its own sake nor show that all agents 
engaging in virtual pedophilia enjoy it intrinsically. 
According to the fourth argument Luck explores, we believe virtual pedophilia is 
wrong because it targets a specific group of people: children. This argument finds virtual 
pedophilia to be wrong as virtual pedophilia is discriminatory. This seems to be a plausible 
argument. After all, we would consider games that focus on murdering members of the 
LGBTQ+ or Muslim communities to be wrong as they would also be discriminatory. 
Games that allow for virtual murder, such as Grand Theft Auto, are not discriminatory but 
rather allow anyone to be murdered. However, Luck finds this unsatisfying as games that 
condone sexually harassing or molesting people of all ages would be just as permissible as 
games that allow individuals of all ages to be murdered. Luck does not explicitly challenge 
the connection between real wrongs and harm, as I will later on, but he does find that the 
focus on victims as opposed to the agent to be unsatisfying. 
Luck’s fifth argument focuses on the special status children hold in moral 
evaluations. This argument would imply that child murder is worse than adult murder just 
as child molestation would be worse than adult molestation due to the ceteris parabis 
clause. However, it is not clear if child molestation is worse than adult murder as 
molestation and murder are not equivalent. If we discard the ceteris parabis clause and 
claim that harm against children is always worse than harm against adults, we arrive at 
unwanted conclusions. We are now forced to claim that spanking a child is worse than 
molesting an adult or that, as Luck states, stealing a child’s lollipop is worse than murdering 
an adult (Luck 35). These strange conclusions weaken this argument, according to Luck. 
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1.3 CONSENT IN VIRTUAL REALITY 
The definition of rape as conceptualized in PR depends upon many things, 
including but not limited to the state of the perpetrator, penetration of the body, the ability 
for the victim to have consented (Office of Public Affairs). Rape in PR occurs to a victim; 
there must be someone who has experienced an assault. Rape in PR is wrong because it 
has harmed someone. Rape in VR does not happen to anyone as agents rape a set of pixels 
that constitute the NPC. As a result, my analysis of virtual rape will focus on the agent and 
their intentions. 
I want to acknowledge that the American legal system agrees with the necessity of 
a victim in physical rape, most notably in cases of attempted rape (Office of Justice 
Programs). The legal system seeks to provide justice for potential victims who have not 
given consent. However, as NPCs can never consent in VR, what are our guidelines for 
distinguishing when sexual encounters in VR are rape? 
1.3.1 Parallel Cases: Rape Fantasies and Rape Pornography 
Virtual rape occurs in an imagined reality which is controlled by agents who engage 
in rape through virtual characters; agents create their online or virtual personas. Often, they 
can choose how their avatars will look in terms of hair color and eye color, how they will 
dress, and what accessories they will carry throughout the game. This relationship between 
agent and character can also be seen in PR rape fantasies and rape pornography, where 
individuals engage in a representation of rape via character. Through these analogous cases 
which I later expand upon, I hope to discover how agent realize their intentions through 
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their avatar. Can an avatar’s intentions differ from the intentions of the player controlling 
it? 
1.3.2 Tokens of Consent 
Consent requires both a willing mental state and communication of that mental state 
to make sexual relations permissible. However, NPCs lack the ability to give consent so 
are all acts of virtual rape? Can we compromise and require stereotypical communications 
of consent, such as nodding or affirmative verbalizations? However, some scenarios look 
like rape or consensual sex. We can argue that an agent can assess whether they would 
have been given consent when engaging in virtual sex, but to reduce consent and rape to 
physical representations is misleading. Instead of focusing on how consent is 
conceptualized and given, I want to focus on the agent. Does the agent desire to receive 
consent or is it of no importance to them? It might seem that we should focus on games 
where sexual encounters appear to be nonconsensual, but I believe that, for our evaluation, 
the appearance of the sexual encounter should come second to the motivations of the agent. 
1.4 UNDERSTANDING INTENTIONALITY 
What is the intention behind virtual rape? The increased agency of VR allows for 
intentions to be fully realized. When an agent enters VR, they inhabit, interact with, and 
react to a new world. Additionally, the agent’s body is more directly translated into the 
virtual environment, enabling them to engage with the virtual landscape. Each experience 
is unique because it is open to all possibilities, within the technical limits of the game, and 
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social mores or legal consequences do not constrain players. They are empowered to act as 
they please.  
The intention, then, is transferred from agent to character, making a character’s 
intentions equivalent to an agent’s intentions – and vice versa. This occurs due to the 
dependent nature of the character upon the agent. The avatar is the mechanism through 
which agents interact with virtual landscapes. Through the avatar, they realize their goals. 
However, is it possible that intentions are not only realized through our avatars but also 
affected by them? Does an avatar have any impact on how an agent feels or sees the world? 
Should we consider the actions and persona of the avatar to be equivalent to that of the 
agent? These questions are an attempt to better understand how the wrongs committed by 
an avatar can reflect both intention and accountability towards its user. 
1.5 NEXT STEPS 
What happens when an agent rapes a character in virtual reality? I want to identify: 
1) what makes this behavior morally wrong; 2) the relationship between committing a 
wrong and harm in cases of virtual rape; 3) the role of intentionality in virtual rape; and 4) 
potential applications to the gamer’s dilemma. I will first answer the most relevant 
questions I have introduced above. I plan to first respond to two challenges to the gamer’s 
dilemma from Stephanie Patridge and Christopher Bartel. Their arguments do not deal 
directly with rape in VR, but their discussions concerning pedophilia and murder in video 
games provide a solid basis for discovering why virtual rape is wrong. Unfortunately, I 
find their arguments are unsatisfying. Patridge’s argument cannot account for the increased 
agency present in VR nor can it separate moral wrongs from harm. As a result, virtual acts 
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are only “wrong” when they harm a marginalized group, and the actions are not inherently 
wrong. Bartel’s argument also does not help us identify the inherent wrong of acts such as 
virtual rape or pedophilia; it ties moral wrongs to harm. 
I will attempt to fill this gap, focusing on how intention, as opposed to harm, plays 
a vital role in helping us identify the wrongs of virtual rape. I will first identify the role that 
consent plays in virtual representations of sex and rape. Next, I will focus on how 
intentionality plays a key role in understanding the wrongs of virtual rape. I will then 
distinguish what makes rape fantasies in PR and rape pornography morally permissible 
whereas engaging in virtual rape is not. I will explore how one’s avatar reflects one’s PR 
intentions and desires in a way that makes the agent eligible for moral evaluation, and 
ultimately moral blame. Finally, I will attempt to answer the gamer’s dilemma, comparing 
virtual rape for virtual murder. 
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2 HARM & REAL WRONGS: A RESPONSE TO STEPHANIE PATRIDGE 
An amoralist understanding of violence in video games argues that engaging in 
violent video games cannot be a real wrong as video games are mere fiction. These claims 
imply that events taking place in virtual reality are not real as they, presumably, lack PR 
consequences and connections to our moral character. When we apply this framework to 
virtual rape, we are forced to conclude that there is nothing wrong with engaging in virtual 
rape.  
Stephanie Patridge challenges against this amoralist perspective, arguing that video 
games have an “incorrigible social meaning” when video game imagery reflect PR 
oppression. Engaging with such imagery reveals a lack of sympathy that makes one eligible 
for moral evaluation. Her argument can help us understand whom Patridge believes is 
harmed by virtual rape. However, I am concerned about her argument’s inability to account 
for the wrong of actions in and of themselves. I believe identifying the inherent wrong of 
virtual rape can help us better understand why engaging in virtual rape is morally suspect. 
To analyze Patridge’s argument, I will first explain what it means for an image to 
reflect a PR phenomenon as well as how that reflection connects to moral virtue. I will then 
explore her concept of “incorrigible social meanings,” concluding that she provides a 
compelling explanation as to why engaging in morally questionable virtual scenarios make 
one eligible for scrutiny. Finally, I will apply Patridge’s account to VR to see how it can 
help us better understand the connection between harm and committing real wrongs. 
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2.1 VIRTUAL REFLECTIONS OF PHYSICAL REALITIES 
Patridge argues that images reflect and perpetuate oppression present in PR. She 
introduces this claim with an imagined image of former President Barack Obama eating a 
watermelon as well as Custer’s Revenge, a video game that simulates the rape of a Native 
American woman. Although the victims of these images are not “really” harmed or “real,” 
respectively, Patridge argues that their real-life models are harmed. In this section, I will 
explore: 1) why and how images are insulting; 2) how images reflect and perpetuate PR 
oppression; 3) the differences between perpetuating and portraying oppression. 
2.1.1 Offensive Imagery 
For those who have grown up in the United States, it is likely we understand the 
origins and social significance of the images Patridge introduces. When Americans 
examine the image of Obama eating a watermelon, it carries a deeper significance than it 
does for non-Americans. Such an image targets Obama as a Black American and has 
historically targeted members of that community. Patridge notes that an image of another 
Black American eating watermelon would also be offensive to Obama and this specific 
community because all community members are targeted by this image and what it 
symbolizes. Reproducing and distributing this image both reflects and perpetuates a PR 
phenomenon. 
Custer’s Revenge is an adult entertainment video game where players control a 
naked cowboy who engages in sexual relations with a Native American woman tied to a 
pole. This image cannot be separated from the historical use of rape as a means of war and 
hostility towards indigenous peoples of North America. According to the Rape, Abuse & 
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Incest National Network (RAINN), one in six women in the United States is a victim of 
rape whereas one in three Native American women will be raped in her lifetime (Patridge 
310). Custer’s Revenge reflects the widespread violence experienced by Native American 
women. It is offensive because it sexualizes violence and players who understand this 
sociocultural context should understand why such imagery, and engaging with such 
imagery, is offensive. 
2.1.2 The Incorrigible Social Meaning of Representations of Harm 
Stephanie Patridge’s concept of incorrigible social meanings helps us better 
understand the relationship between images and harm. According to Patridge, an image has 
an “incorrigible social meaning” when there are limited ways in which it can be interpreted. 
As a result of its limited potential interpretations, it is evident to an agent when an image 
reflects an oppressive feature of PR. Images with incorrigible social meanings reflect and 
contribute to the “egregious, long-term, systematic denials of justice that are of a particular 
kind: oppression” (Patridge 310). Oppression is of moral concern as it denies individuals 
the respect they deserve as human beings. It is wrong to enjoy representations of such harm 
and as victims of oppression are denied their human rights by others, it must be “others 
who must accord them [the] dignity” that has been denied (Patridge 311). Thus, agents who 
engage in oppression willingly and continuously have a severe lack of sympathy. There is 
a moral obligation for agents not only to sympathize with the realities of oppression that 
others face but also to not contribute to that oppression by endorsing it. Agents who do so 
are “tone deaf to an obvious feature of our moral reality” (Patridge 310). Patridge believes 
this inability and unwillingness to empathize makes an agent eligible for moral evaluation. 
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Patridge identifies a moral duty: agents should understand the specific context or 
morally offensive imagery. As a result, it would be morally wrong for Americans to 
produce caricatures of Obama eating watermelon whereas it would not be as morally 
reprehensible for non-Americans who cannot understand the sociocultural context. Asking 
players to be cognizant of their actions is not unreasonable but rather asks them to cultivate 
self-awareness. To be willfully unaware of oppressive PR phenomena perpetuates 
oppression as it validates mindsets that lead to physical and structural violence. When we 
apply this to virtual rape, it is possible that it is wrong to engage in virtual rape as it 
continues PR oppression that contributes to rape. Thus, according to Patridge’s argument, 
it is wrong to perpetuate rape against those who suffer from it in PR. 
2.1.3 Contextualization 
What happens when we remove the cultural contextualization that Patridge relies 
upon to identify incorrigible social meanings? An image of an alien eating watermelon 
would not be considered offensive given that aliens have not suffered PR racism. Could 
we say the same of a video game that ended with the rape of an alien? We understand that 
games such as Custer’s Revenge are wrong as they reflect and condone systematic denials 
of justice of Native American women. It seems then that if an agent played a game where 
they virtually raped an alien or a non-disabled heterosexual white man, we should question 
their moral character just as we would question the moral character of Custer’s Revenge 
enthusiasts. 
However, incorrigible social meanings depend upon oppression. It seems then that 
raping any character in any form of Custer’s Revenge, including the white man we have 
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previously discussed, is wrong as it denies the rights of that individual. However, is the 
virtual rape of someone from a privileged social location truly a product of oppression? As 
Patridge has defined oppression, it is the systematic denial of a group of peoples’ rights in 
PR. Engaging with images that have incorrigible social meanings endorses oppression, 
validating and perpetuating that harm. It seems then that this account does not include 
individuals who do not experience oppression in real life. They cannot experience 
oppression in VR because they do not experience it in PR. There is no preexisting form of 
oppression to perpetuate or to endorse. In other words, Patridge’s account depends on an 
individual’s experience of oppression in PR. The wrongs of virtual rape connect to physical 
harm which only falls upon those who experience systematic denials of rights in PR. 
Patridge provides a satisfying explanation as to what occurs when we engage in 
certain representations of harm. Her account relies upon the existence of victims, 
specifically victims who are already marginalized. However, this is alarming because if PR 
phenomena are indeed reflected in video games and virtual reality, Patridge’s account 
neglects potential and existing victims. Patridge has also not answered what is wrong about 
the action itself. If we can identify the inherent wrong of virtual rape, we can also 
acknowledge potential victims of virtual rape who are not from marginalized social 
locations. 
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3 VIRTUAL PORNOGRAPHY & VIRTUAL RAPE: A RESPONSE TO 
CHRISTOPHER BARTEL 
I believe rape in VR is an extension of the gamer’s dilemma, or the inability to 
identify a clear moral distinction between virtual murder and virtual pedophilia. Remember 
that virtual pedophilia is a form of virtual rape, so when all virtual rape and virtual murder 
occur, there are supposedly no “real” consequences of victims. However, as we have seen 
from Patridge’s account, virtual wrongs do have PR consequences. I want to now clarify 
the connection that exists between harm and committing real wrongs when analyzing 
virtual rape. 
In “Resolving the gamer’s dilemma,” Christopher Bartel challenges Morgan Luck’s 
conclusion that virtual pedophilia and virtual murder lack a relevant moral distinction. 
Bartel finds that Luck overlooks pedophilia’s connection to virtual pornography. As child 
pornography harms individuals, so does virtual pedophilia. Bartel expands upon Neil 
Levy’s argument that mainstream pornography eroticizes women’s inequality. Bartel 
ultimately finds that virtual pedophilia harms women and is thus morally objectionable. 
This connection creates a distinction between virtual murder and virtual pedophilia, 
condemning virtual pedophilia but condoning virtual murder. When we apply Bartel’s 
argument to our case of virtual rape, it is possible that rape in VR has a connection to 
pornography that makes virtual rape wrong. 
I will first briefly outline Bartel’s critique of Luck’s response to the gamer’s 
dilemma. I will then evaluate Bartel’s claim that virtual pedophilia is equivalent to virtual 
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pornography. Finally, I will expand the connection he draws between virtual pedophilia 
and harm to women to better understand the wrongs of rape in VR.  
3.1 BARTEL’S DISTINCTIONS 
Bartel attempts to answer the gamer’s dilemma by arguing that virtual pedophilia 
is equivalent to child pornography, as both require representations of sexual acts involving 
children. As child pornography is morally objectionable, so is virtual pedophilia. To 
analyze Bartel’s argument, I will first explore the relationship Bartel establishes between 
virtual pedophilia and child pornography by identifying what constitutes pornography. I 
will then address Bartel’s inability to account for the increased agency present in video 
games and virtual reality. I will finally analyze his claim that virtual pedophilia harms 
women, seeking to identify if the connection between harm and committing wrongs is 
necessary. 
3.1.1 Defining Pornography 
Bartel argues that virtual pedophilia and child pornography are equivalent in that 
they are both dependent upon images of children engaging in sexual acts. However, images 
of sexual relations are not always considered pornographic and contemporary images that 
are not intended to be pornographic as consumed as such. For example, Sports Illustrated 
and Victoria’s Secret lingerie catalogs are not produced to be pornographic but are often 
used as pornography (Bartel 14). The videos of Park Seo-Yeon, a woman who reported 
making $9,000 a month for simply eating on camera, are often consumed for sexual 
gratification although they are not sexually explicit in any way (Huffington Post). It seems 
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that for an image to be pornographic, it must be consumed by the majority of its viewers 
in a sexual way. Sexually explicit images of children are not only produced with 
pornographic intentions but are also consumed as such. 
I agree with Bartel: how the agent discovers such images is unimportant. What is 
important is that they voluntarily choose to engage with such imagery, transforming it into 
pornography to be consumed for the agent’s pleasure. They enjoy the images intrinsically, 
and their pleasure depends upon sexual arousal. As such, it seems fair to equalize virtual 
pedophilia and child pornography as it is both intended and consumed to be sexually 
arousing for the majority of its users. 
3.1.2 Harm to Women 
Bartel identifies women as the victims of both virtual pedophilia and virtual child 
pornography. He also argues as “no actual child is harmed by either” virtual pedophilia or 
virtual child pornography (Bartel 15). I am interested in his first claim and concerned with 
his second; I also believe that Bartel’s belief that the wrongs of virtual pedophilia must be 
tied to harm is misleading. I will first explore his two claims before arguing that the 
implications of his argument allow for virtual acts that we should find morally 
reprehensible.  
I will first explore Bartel’s claim that mainstream pornography harms women 
before addressing its application to virtual pedophilia. Bartel argues that women are 
harmed by mainstream pornography as it eroticizes inequality as it presents women as 
“sexually submissive objects for the enjoyment of men” (Bartel 15). In PR, pornography 
portrays women in degrading or humiliating scenarios for the pleasure of men. Bartel’s 
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argument must create a connection between mainstream pornography, virtual pedophilia, 
and virtual child pornography as well as prove how virtual pornography perpetuates the 
inequality inherent to PR pornography. 
Firstly, in what ways are virtual pedophilia, virtual child pornography, and 
mainstream pornography similar and different? As we have previously discussed, they are 
all manufactured and consumed for sexual gratification – but this only argues what we 
already know: all three can be considered pornographic. However, Bartel argues that all 
three validate inequality, specifically women’s inequality. Mainstream pornography 
features mainly women in sexually degrading acts, as victims of sexual violence, and as 
recipients of sexual aggression. Women then are not only harmed in the production of 
pornography but are also harmed by the consumption of pornography, as it eroticizes their 
inequality. 
Bartel overlooks the stigmatization of child pornography and links it to mainstream 
pornography because both eroticize inequality. The unbalanced power dynamic inherent to 
child pornography is a form of inequality that is sexualized for and by viewers. As virtual 
pedophilia is equivalent to child pornography, engaging in virtual pedophilia is to engage 
in the eroticization of inequality. Children do not experience an unequal status in society, 
as women do, so they do not suffer from the inequality inherent to mainstream and child 
pornography. It follows from Bartel’s argument that women, not children, are harmed by 
virtual pedophilia because it sexualizes the inequality they experience in PR. 
I find this argument to be similar to the fourth and fifth arguments Luck explores 
in “The gamer’s dilemma.” The fourth argument stated that virtual pedophilia is wrong 
because it exploits children, who occupy a special status in our moral evaluations. The fifth 
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argument claims that children hold a special status in moral evaluation. However, the fifth 
argument depends upon the ceteris parabis clause which we found to be unsatisfying as it 
claimed that any harm that fell upon children would automatically be considered worse 
than any harm that fell upon an adult. By retaining the ceteris parabis clause, we could 
permit pornography that depicted members of privileged social groups in degrading sexual 
situations. Thus, when we apply Bartel’s argument to virtual rape, it seems that virtual 
raping someone from a privileged social group is acceptable. Representations of harm, 
according to Bartel and Patridge, perpetuate harm only to peoples who are marginalized in 
PR. The need to relate virtual wrong to PR harm is misleading, distracting us from the 
inherent wrong of sexualizing inequality or engaging in representations of sexual harm. 
The implications that follow from Bartel and Patridge’s arguments highlight the inability 
of their arguments to explain why virtual rape is inherently wrong. 
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4 INTENTIONALITY AND REAL WRONGS 
We have yet to identify the wrongs of rape in VR despite exploring compelling 
arguments from Stephanie Patridge and Christopher Bartel. Both Patridge and Bartel focus 
their arguments on victims, whom all belong to marginalized groups in society. These prior 
arguments do not find a moral fault with rape in virtual reality unless it is linked to harm 
in PR. The inability to disconnect the connection between harm and virtual wrongs 
prevents us from finding the inherent wrongs that exist in engaging with virtual rape. In 
this final section, I will argue that virtual rape is inherently wrong and does not need to be 
connected to harm in PR to be considered morally reprehensible. I will first argue that an 
agent’s desires and intentions extend into VR in a way that makes the agent accountable 
for the virtual acts they commit, regardless of whom they harm. I will then analyze the case 
of Elizabeth Xan Wilson and Joel Rene Valdez, two individuals involved in a controversial 
rape case in Texas, to further emphasize the role that intentionality plays in making an 
agent morally accountable for virtual rape. Next, I will compare two parallel cases: rape 
fantasies in PR and rape pornography. Finally, I will attempt to identify a moral distinction 
between virtual rape and virtual murder to answer a generalized version of the gamer’s 
dilemma. 
4.1 AGENCY AND MORAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
I believe that players can most fully realize their desires in virtual reality as opposed 
to physical reality. Firstly, I want to highlight the physical agency one experiences in 
virtual reality. When an agent enters virtual reality, they are fully immersed in a new 
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landscape. Virtual reality is not merely what is directly seen by the agent; the 360-degree 
aspect of VR creates a new world. In this new world, the physical body is integrated into 
the virtual body or the body of the avatar. The avatar’s body is responsive to the mind’s 
intentions just as the body would respond to the mind’s intentions in PR. For example, 
when the agent utilizes the HTC VIVE, the movement of their arms corresponds to the 
movement of their avatar’s arms. The agent has the desire and thought to move their body, 
they do so in PR, and this action is replicated in VR. This level of bodily integration 
empowers the agent to interact with their fully immersive environment more easily. 
Secondly, I believe that the specific type of virtual reality we have envisioned is where the 
agent is most empowered. There are no legal, societal, or physical consequences to one’s 
actions in VR. After all, there currently does not exist a governing body that regulates 
behavior in VR. Additionally, as all other characters are NPCs, there is no one to challenge 
the agent’s demands or desires. The agent can fully realize their intentions as every other 
character and object exist for the agent’s pleasure. 
If the agent is using the game for its intended purposes, that of finding pleasure, 
what is morally reprehensible about the way the agent chooses to utilize the game? The 
moral issue stems from the agent’s intention to engage in rape. Whether the rape is a 
representation or a physical engagement, it signifies the desire to participate in the denial 
of a person’s rights. The victim’s well-being is overlooked as they are diminished to an 
object to be exploited for the agent’s sexual gratification. The agent desires to engage in 
this activity and does so willingly, realizing their intentions through their avatar. Virtual 
rape is an actualization of the desire to rape. After all, an avatar cannot perpetuate a virtual 
rape unless its corresponding agent intends for it do so. Although the agent does not harm 
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someone physically, they endorse their desire to participate in dehumanization and do so 
in an environment where they will suffer no consequences. To hold virtual rapists 
accountable is to condemn not only the intention to dehumanize but also the willingness to 
engage in such behavior. 
4.1.1 Intentionality in Three Cases 
When we typically think of physical rape, we think of who has been harmed by 
experiencing sexual violence. Rape occurs to someone who has had their rights and body 
violated. Previous arguments have attempted to find the wrongs of virtual rape or virtual 
pedophilia by identifying victims of harm. They have done so by linking virtual acts to 
physical consequences before arguing that virtual acts are morally wrong as they harm 
people who are already marginalized. Virtual acts then reinforce preexisting wrongs but 
are not inherently wrong. I have argued that harm is not necessary to discovering the 
wrongs of virtual rape by focusing on the intention of the agent who wants to perpetuate 
virtual rape. However, two faults seem to appear with this focus. The first objection 
addresses dehumanization. To reduce someone to a tool for pleasure is to harm them. Can 
harm be removed from dehumanization? Secondly, the agent dehumanizes a representation 
of an individual or an NPC. As a result, no person is dehumanized or exploited. Is this truly 
dehumanization or is there an unidentified wrong in virtual rape? I will explore three cases: 
Wilson – Valdez, rape fantasies, and rape pornography; I will first emphasize the 
importance of intentionality in finding the wrong of virtual rape and then answer these 
objections. 
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4.1.2 Three Cases 
Our first case is the rape of Elizabeth Xan Wilson who was raped at knifepoint by 
Joel Rene Valdez. Valdez entered Wilson’s apartment without permission and coerced her 
into sexual relations by utilizing a deadly weapon. Wilson requested that Valdez use a 
condom which a Texas jury understood to be a verbalization of consent. The jury concluded 
that because she did not communicate a lack of consent, she had consented to engage in 
sexual relations with Valdez. 
Our second case involves Molly and Katy who both desire to engage in a rape 
fantasy. They create an identical storyline to the Wilson – Valdez case. Molly will enter 
Katy’s apartment, coerce her with a knife, and rape her. The scenario will end if either 
Molly or Katy use their designated safe word. Our third case is the creation of a 
pornographic film starring Henry and Jessica. Like Molly and Katy’s fantasy, the 
pornographic film has an identical storyline to the Wilson – Valdez case. Henry and Jessica 
freely agree to create this film and designate a safeword. 
Although the actions appear identical, it seems that Valdez is the outlier. The 
obvious distinction between Molly, Henry, and Valdez is the state of mind of those engaged 
in sexual relations. Katy and Jessica were consenting whereas Wilson was not but we have 
yet to accomplish anything meaningful regarding better understanding rape in virtual 
reality. I believe that our focus on the victims forces us to overlook the intentions of Valdez, 
Molly, and Henry. It is clear that Valdez intended to rape Wilson. Molly and Henry did not 
intend to rape Katy and Jessica. Unlike Valdez, they did not value their sexual satisfaction 
at the expense of someone else’s bodily autonomy and integrity. We have established that 
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Molly and Henry did not have the same intentions as Valdez, but their characters did. 
Should we hold Molly, Henry, and Valdez equally accountable? 
4.1.3 The Relationship Between Agent and Avatar 
One could argue that the actions of the avatar are not an accurate representation of 
the agent. After all, when an actor plays a murderer on television, they play a character 
who is not a reflection of themselves. Firstly, the actor is bound by a script whereas the 
agent is not but what is more important, and relevant, is the connection between agent and 
character. How does the relationship between virtual avatar and agent differ from the actor 
and the murderer character? I previously argued that the integration of the virtual and 
physical body hints at a type of agency that empowers the agent to realize their desires. 
However, the integration of physical bodies does not always indicate an integration of 
desires. However, doesn’t it seem strange to say that the agent’s desires can or should be 
integrated with the desires of the avatar? The avatar has no mind, no desires, and no fears. 
It does not exist unless it is created. It does not move unless it is willed to do so by the 
agent. In other words, it only “lives” when the agent wills it to do so. This complete 
dependence reminds us that an agent’s intentions are translated into and through the avatar. 
After all, the agent must realize their intention to have an avatar and must realize their 
intention to have the avatar interact with virtual reality. It is the agent that chooses to 
engage in virtual rape, virtual murder, or virtual charity through the avatar. The avatar is a 
vehicle for the agent who lives out the full extent of their desires in the virtual landscape. 
However, the cases of Molly, Katy, Henry, and Jessica can be interpreted to support 
the opposite claim. When an agent engages in rape pornography or a rape fantasy, they do 
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not intend to rape but are rather playing a character who has that intention. There seemed 
to be a clear barrier between Molly and Henry and the characters that they played. Consent 
seems to have made engaging in those representations of rape morally permissible. 
Furthermore, Molly and Henry ensured that their “victims” consented to participate in an 
engagement of rape. They did not intend to diminish Katy or Jessica to objects or exploit 
them for pleasure. Molly and Henry, however, differ in that Molly does derive pleasure 
from engaging in rape fantasies. She finds the experience of engaging in rape, and 
subsequently dehumanization, to be enjoyable. Despite her fantasies, she does not actualize 
her intentions in the way that Valdez did. She sought consent – but is that enough to render 
this intention morally permissible? 
Unlike Valdez, Molly does not actualize her desires through physical rape because 
she does not intend to harm another being. It seems unreasonable to hold someone 
accountable for every morally suspect thought or desire they may experience. Molly 
demonstrates self-restraint. She seeks out consent because she understands that acting upon 
every desire can lead to harm. She prioritizes Katy’s well-being over her sexual needs, as 
demonstrated by the use of the safe word. We cannot hold Valdez and Molly equally 
accountable for the wrongs of virtual rape as their intentions, and the way they realize their 
intentions, differ. 
4.2 SOLVING THE GAMER’S DILEMMA 
Patridge and Bartel have provided solutions to the gamer’s dilemma with 
arguments that are based upon harm. However, I have challenged the connection between 
harm and committing real wrong, arguing that the wrong of virtual rape is the 
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actualization of the intention to reduce another human being to a tool for pleasure. 
Intending to participate in such an action reflects not only willingness but enjoyment. I 
argue that the intentionality of virtual murder and virtual rape do not differ as virtual 
murder also results in dehumanization. 
When we murder a character in virtual reality, we do so for pleasure. The agent 
seeks satisfaction from their ability to murder, whether that be from the skill required to 
shoot a virtual gun or control their virtual body to strangle or beat their victim. The agent 
intends to murder, and they actualize that intention by utilizing violence against another 
character. The prevalence of murder-based games may make this claim appear harsh, but, 
as Morgan Luck argued, socialization does not always align with morality. In both virtual 
murder and virtual rape, the victim becomes not only an object but also a virtual toy to be 
exploited as the agent sees fit. To desire to engage in such behavior, to intend to do so, 
and to pursue these actions in an environment without repercussions is morally 
reprehensible.  
 
  
 28 
5 CONCLUSION 
 Through this thesis, I sought to 1) explain what constitutes as virtual rape; 2) 
identify moral differences between rape in VR and PR, focusing on consent and 
representations of rape; 3) challenge the idea that virtual wrongs must be based upon PR 
harm; and 4) argue that virtual rape is morally wrong because it is the realization of an 
agent’s intentions to dehumanize other peoples. Finally, I found no relevant moral 
distinction between virtual rape and virtual murder as both results in dehumanization. 
 Firstly, all sexual engagements in virtual reality are not rape and should not be 
considered rape. NPCs cannot consent but what is important is that the agent intends to 
engage in virtual rape. Secondly, as our analogous cases of rape pornography and rape 
fantasies showed, intention is important when one chooses to engage in representations of 
rape. Unlike Valdez, Molly and Henry do not intend to utilize their partners as sexual 
objects. The well-being of their partners is prioritized regardless of if they contradict with 
Molly and Henry’s desires. Valdez, however, intends to dehumanize Wilson for the sake 
of his desires and realizes those intentions in a way that is morally reprehensible. The agent 
who engages in virtual rape, although they do not harm another human being, has similar 
intentions to Valdez. The agent realizes those intentions in an empowered setting and the 
actualization of those intentions should be seen as morally reprehensible. Finally, I find 
Patridge and Bartel’s arguments unsatisfying because of their reliance upon harm to find 
virtual crimes wrong. According to Patridge and Bartel, acts such as virtual pedophilia and 
virtual rape are wrong because they perpetuate harm against those who are already 
oppressed in PR. The need to connect harm and wrongs in VR is misleading. Regardless 
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of who is harmed, realizing one’s intentions to engage in dehumanization, whether that is 
through virtual rape or virtual murder, is wrong. Intentionality matters, especially in VR 
when an agent is not limited by the consequences they may face in PR. As agents are most 
empowered in VR, their actions are most indicative of their desires and intentions. Thus, 
they must be held morally accountable for the intentions that lead them to commit acts such 
as rape or murder in VR. 
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